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Introduction
I had never met Ken Mason until I came to work with him. It was a terrifying prospect
from afar but the reality was so completely different to what I had imagined. When I 
took up a position in the School of Law at the University of Edinburgh in 1995 Ken 
assured me that this would be his last year of teaching and research. He has said that 
every year since; and here we are, ten years on, still working together, and I have long 
since become infected with his irrepressible enthusiasm for medical law. To understand 
Ken Mason’s contribution to the discipline, however, it is important to appreciate not 
only the impact of his training in medicine or the influence of his faith,1 but also his 
unwaivering commitment to others. His dedication to his students at times knows no 
bounds; his sense of professional duty – medical and academic – is profound. If ever 
there was a team player it is Ken Mason. He is a self-confessed “communitarian” for 
whom, then, the rise and rise of the role of patient choice in the development of medical 
law over the course of its relatively short life2 is something of an anathema. 
I feel confident in saying this not only because of my decade-long relationship of 
working closely with him, but also because of the wealth of publications he has produced 
which stand as a testament to his views. Central among these is his seminal work with 
Sandy McCall-Smith, Law and Medical Ethics, which was first published in 1983 and which 
goes into its seventh edition in 2005; it will henceforth be known as Mason and McCall-
Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics. The partnership of Mason and McCall-Smith has 
represented a unique voice in medical law which has never doggedly adhered to the 
mantra of ‘patient autonomy’ in the course of the developments of the last 30 years or so. 
Rather, they have sought balance in responding to the – often overwhelming – range of 
issues which has washed up on their desks demanding attention. At times, that search for 
a balance has been between private and public interests – where, for example, should we 
place limits on patient autonomy in defence of broader community interests (whether 
these be about public health, allocation of resources or the sort of society in which we 
want to live)?; at other junctures the tension to be resolved has been between private 
interests – what, for example, of the autonomy of the patient face-à-face the autonomy of 
others, such as her parents, relatives or, even, her doctor?    
This chapter explores Ken Mason’s contributions to medical law by focussing on his 
writings and other musings in and around notions of personal autonomy. It takes its 
                                                
1 ‘It is important that authors in this field show their colours and I think it only fair to readers to 
say that I am a practising Roman Catholic; but this does not mean that I can have no individual 
conscience. In any case, what I am trying to speak of is the ethical practice of medicine, not the 
application of religious precept’: Mason, J.K., Human Life and Medical Practice, Edinburgh, 
Edinburgh University Press, 1988, p.vii. 
2 When did medical law begin? Consider the work of the influential figures of Ian Kennedy, 
Andrew Grubb and Sheila McLean in the 1970s and 1980s, and in whose company we must also 
include Alexander McCall-Smith and Ken Mason himself; but other such figures, including 
Margaret Brazier and Derek Morgan, have pointed to the as-yet largely unexplored historical 
jurisprudence in various quarters of the medico-legal world. 
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structure from an event that was held in Edinburgh in 1998 to contemplate The Future of 
Medical Law and Ethics and at which Ken delivered the keynote address. In looking
forward to where we were going he also looked back to where we had been: his family 
crest is of a dog marching along and looking over his shoulder and the motto is Respiciens 
Surgo or ‘Looking Backwards, I Go Forward’. This chapter, then, involves both a 
retrospective on cases which Mason has considered to be of crucial importance in the 
development of medical law, as well as a horizon-gazing exercise for the future which 
draws on my own work with Mason about the relative importance and impact of 
concepts of patient autonomy. I should stress, however, that what follows is a very 
personal interpretation of what my colleague and friend has had to say.       
“The five most significant decisions in the United Kingdom over the 
past 30 years”
You can learn a lot from reading the preface of books. The preface to the fifth edition of 
Law and Medical Ethics reads:
One of us recently delivered a paper in which an attempt was made to choose, and justify 
the choice of, five most significant decisions in the United Kingdom over the past 30 years. 
The fact that the choice of Re B,3 Gillick v Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority,4 Re MB 
(adult: medical treatment),5 A-G’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994)6 and R v Cox7 would be unlikely to 
be that of any other interested observer goes simply to illustrate the enormous diversity of 
this academic field.
The paper referred to is Ken Mason’s keynote address at the conference The Future of 
Medical Law and Ethics held in the School of Law at the University of Edinburgh on 31 
October 1998. This paper has never been published. Yet, one of the great advantages of 
working with Ken Mason - beyond access to the man himself - is access to his extensive 
library, including his unpublished papers. This particular paper is tantalising in giving us a 
modicum of insight into his choice of these five cases over the many thousands of others 
that make up the discipline of medical law. Together with his extensive publications and 
my personal experiences of working with him, therefore, I think it is possible to use it as 
a platform to assess the sheer range and extent of influence that Ken Mason’s 
contributions have had on medical law in the United Kingdom.   
Re B
It is perhaps ironic to begin a discussion of autonomy with a case which is ostensibly 
about the best interests of a person who – to all extents and purposes - has no autonomy.
Much of the value of the case, however, lies in the question, whose autonomy is at stake?: a 
perennial issue for Mason.   
Re B concerned a child with Down’s syndrome who was also suffering from an intestinal 
obstruction that would prove fatal but for surgical intervention which, in the event, 
would be a relatively straightforward procedure. Notwithstanding, the parents felt that it 
would be unkind to subject their daughter to such an intervention and that it would be 
                                                
3 [1981] 1 WLR 1421, [1990] 3 All ER 927.
4 [1986] AC 112, [1985] 2 All ER 402, HL.
5 [1997] 2 FCR 541, (1997) 38 BMLR 175, CA.
6 [1998] AC 245, [1997] 3 All ER 936, HL.
7 (1992) 12 BMLR 38.
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best for her not to have the operation; the consequence would be the death of the child
within a matter of days. She was made a ward of court in the face of the parents’ refusal 
and moved to another hospital for the operation, but the surgeon charged with carrying 
it out refused to do so:
I decided…to respect the wishes of the parents and not to perform the operation, a 
decision which would, I believe (after 20 years in the medical profession), be taken by the 
great majority of surgeons faced with a similar situation.8
While other surgeons were found who were prepared to operate, the climate of the time 
shows how there was genuine ambivalence among the medical profession as to whether 
and how far parental choice should be respected.9 The importance of the case lies in the 
fact that it established for the first time the parameters of the autonomy of parents faced 
with life and death decisions concerning their children. For Mason, however, the case 
also represents a watershed moment in establishing how the British courts would 
reconcile tensions between autonomous choices (albeit in the name of another) and the 
principle of respect for sanctity of life. In his 1988 work, Human Life and Medical Practice,
for example, he asks poignantly: ‘Can we honestly say that parents can and should decide 
that their child must die when there is no evidence that this is its preferred option?’10
This, in fact, also engages a further important perspective that Mason has long 
supported, namely, the incorporation of the perspective of the incapacitated person into 
the decision-making process in respect of their care. He has argued in various places for 
the adoption of an objective substituted judgment test as a preferred, more honest 
approach to the best interests test which prevails in the United Kingdom.11 Unlike the 
normal operation of a substituted judgment test which seeks to take the actual prior views 
of a person into account - and so is of no utility if no such prior wishes exist (as in the 
case of neonates and the life-long incapax) - Mason’s construct of an objective test asks 
what would this person want if they could express views on their circumstances, 
objectively assessed. In a further interesting twist, however, Mason sees this not only as 
promoting a less paternalistic version of patient autonomy but also as permitting a wider 
range of extraneous interests to enter the fray, for example, those of relatives, carers or 
even the state. 12 It is disingenuous to apply a best interests test which, it is claimed, 
considers all such other interests to be irrelevant yet which also ignores the realities of 
medical practice and the fact of overlapping and inter-connected interests.13 Best interests 
also deprives the incapax of the opportunity to be altruistic or selfless – which in itself is 
                                                
8 Re B, n 3 above [1981] WLR at 1423; [1990] All ER at 928.   
9 From the leading medical literature of the time we have this: ‘…in the absence of a clear code to 
which society society adheres there is no justification for usurping parents’ rights’, see Editorial 
Comment, ‘The Right to Live and the Right to Die’ (1981) 283 British Medical Journal 569.
10 Human Life and Medical Practice, n 1 above, p.65. 
11 See, for example, Mason, J.K., ‘Master of the Balancers: Non-voluntary Therapy under the 
Mantle of Lord Donaldson’ [1993] Juridical Review 115. In particular, see the rulings of Lord 
Donaldson in Re J (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) [1990] 2 All ER 930, (1992) 6 BMLR 25 and 
Re J (a minor)(medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 614, [1993] Fam 15.   
12 We explore this further in Mason, J.K. and Laurie, G.T., Mason and McCall-Smith’s Law and 
Medical Ethics, (7th Ed), Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2005, paras 16.130 – 16.138. 
13 Although see Re T (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242, [1997] 1 All ER 906 in 
which the court did take into account the impact of requiring a child to undergo a liver transplant 
on the parents and their ability (and willingness) to care for that child subsequently. Here 
‘parental autonomy’ – in the sense of determining the interest of the family unit and including the 
child’s best interests - was upheld.
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an interest, and one which we do recognise in other contexts, for example, when 
involving incapacitated persons in research.14
But even this conception of substituted judgment has its limits, as Mason acknowledges, 
and Re B is, indeed, a prime example of this. The court had no evidence whatsoever to 
determine the future quality of life of the child, and as Lord Templeman said: 
‘[t]he evidence in this case only goes to show that if the operation takes place and is 
successful then the child may live the normal span of a mongoloid child with the 
handicaps and defects and life of a mongol child, and it is not for this court to say that life 
of that description ought to be extinguished’.15
There is a fundamental distinction to be drawn between physical and mental defects; 
while we, as potential proxy decision-makers, might be able to say how tolerable life 
might be having to live with physical pain and suffering, none of us who is privileged 
enough to be free of mental affliction knows what it is like to be a person with Down’s 
Syndrome.16 Faced with such uncertainty the Court of Appeal in Re B preferred to 
respect the sanctity of the life of the child; in doing so, however, it also established the 
defining parameters for future decisions in respect of life and death decisions 
surrounding the (non)-provision of medical treatment, namely, quality of life and 
intolerability. As Templeman LJ said: 
There may be cases … of severe proved damage where the future is so certain and where 
the life of the child is so bound to be full of pain and suffering that the court might be 
driven to a different conclusion.17
We shall return to the notion of intolerability and Mason’s view of substituted 
judgment presently. For now, it is suffice to note that it is not a view that has (yet) 
been accepted by the British courts.18 Re B proceeded on the basis of an application of 
the best interests test. It was an ex tempore judgment and as such extends to only a few 
pages; much of its impact therefore was left to be felt in the wake of the subsequent 
jurisprudence.19 Notwithstanding, the judgment was clearly the gateway to a new era 
which positioned the notion of a patient’s best interests – essentially a paternalistic 
stance - at the centre of disputes over the care of incapacitated patients.20
While this means that, in the main, the autonomy of the patient is either entirely 
excluded or resigned to a residual role, the autonomy of others is none the less further 
engaged, viz, who will decide those best interests? The subsequent jurisprudence 
reveals a very strong reluctance on the part of the courts to interfere with clinical 
autonomy when it comes to assessments as to the futility of beginning or continuing 
                                                
14 See, for example, provisions in both the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the Adults with Incapacity 
(Scotland) Act 2000 which permit incapacitated persons to take part in research subject to stringent 
safeguards. 
15 Re B, n 3 above, per Templeman LJ [1981] WLR at 1424; [1990] All ER at 929.. 
16 See further Mason, J.K., Medico-legal Aspects of Reproduction and Parenthood, Aldershot, Gower 
Publishing Group, 1990, p.262.
17 [1990] 3 All ER 927 at 929, [1981] 1 WLR 1421 at 1424.
18 But see Lord Donaldson in the Re J cases, n 11 above, and our commentary in Mason and 
McCall-Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, n 12 above, paras 16.35 – 16.37, where he comes very close 
to applying a substituted judgment test.
19 We discuss this in Mason and McCall-Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, n 12 above, chapter 16.
20 The general principles were laid down in Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, s 1. See, now, Children 
Act 1989, s 1.
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treatment. Indeed, the courts will not require practitioners to administer treatment 
against their better clinical judgment.21 Matters may be different when the dynamics of 
a dispute are reversed, that is, when clinical judgment is in favour of care and the carers 
of the patient disagree.22 Certainly, the courts have clarified that the best interests test 
refers to best overall interests and not merely best medical interests.23 The advent of 
the Human Rights Act 1998 has done little to change the established orthodoxy; 
indeed, in the case of Re Wyatt (a child)(medical treatment: parents’ consent) it was said that: 
‘…in this case at least the Convention now adds nothing to domestic law’.24 Although 
it has been confirmed that disputes over child care and treatment should be referred 
to the courts because of the need to respect the child’s human rights,25 it has also been 
confirmed, both domestically26 and by the European Court of Human rights itself,27
that an application of the best interests test by the medical profession on grounds of 
futility and which leads to the death of the child can be perfectly compatible with the 
Articles of the European Convention on Human Rights.       
It seems, then, that the largely paternalistic approach of the best interests test remains 
ensconced in our law. It deserves such a label for two good reasons: (1) the essential 
framing of the construct places more focus on third party assessments of interests 
than on the autonomy of the patient, and (2) because it admits a significant role to the 
most paternalistic of all professions; a role which is no longer determinative but 
remains hugely influential. For those for whom paternalism remains a very dirty word,
then, we might ask if matters could be balanced differently. It is here that we return to 
Mason’s construct of the substituted judgment test. While he acknowledges that in 
most cases the outcome will be the same whether we apply best interests or 
substituted judgment, a recent example shows both the development of the law in this 
field and a perfect illustration of where Mason’s model might make a real difference.
W Healthcare NHS Trust v H and Another28 involved a patient who had been suffering from 
multiple sclerosis for 30 years, the last five of which involved artificial feeding and 
hydration and 24-hour care. She was barely conscience or sentient and when her feeding 
tube became displaced the question arose of whether it should be replaced. The first 
important point to note about the Court of Appeal decision is its reliance on the neonate 
ruling of Re J.29 Mason and I have long-maintained that a continuum exists between 
withholding and withdrawal dilemmas from the beginning of life onwards, and this is the 
                                                
21 See the Re J cases, n 11 above. Compare the first instance ruling in R (on the application of Burke) 
v General Medical Council [2005] 2 WLR 431, [2004] 3 FCR 579  and our associated commentary: 
Mason, J.K. and Laurie, G.T., ‘Personal Autonomy and the Right to Treatment: A Note on R (on 
the application of Burke) v General Medical Council’(2005) 9 Edinburgh Law Review 123. But 
see now the devastating reversal of the decision by Court of Appeal on 28 July 2005, available at 
[2005] EWCA 1003.
22 Re T, n 13 above. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Re Wyatt (a child)(medical treatment: parents’ consent) [2004] Fam Law 866. 
25 Glass v United Kingdom [2004] 1 FLR 1019, (2004) 77 BMLR 120.
26 A NHS Trust v D [2000] 2 FLR 677, (2000) 55 BMLR 19 (although it should be noted en passant
that the facts of the case occurred a time before the Human Rights Act 1998 was in force).  
27 Glass, n 25 above. While the decision went against the United Kingdom in this case, this was 
primarily because the dispute had not been taken to court; the provisions of Article 8(2) ECHR 
could not, therefore, be relied upon. Notwithstanding, the ECtHR confirmed the acceptability of 
applying a best interests test.  
28 [2004] EWCA Civ 1324, [2005] 1 WLR 834.
29 Re J [1990], n 11 above.
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first explicit judicial acknowledgement of this as far as I know. It means, therefore, not 
only that best interests must apply in these cases, but also that intolerability becomes the 
watch-word as Lord Templeman suggested in Re B. Importantly, it also means that the 
court could not rely on the strong evidence from the family, who were opposing 
reinsertion of the feeding tube, that their relative would not want to be kept alive in such 
a state. From the best interests/intolerability perspective, however, Brooke LJ had this to 
say, bearing in mind that the patient was not wholly insensate: 
The Court cannot in effect sanction the death by starvation of a patient who is not in a 
PVS state other than with their clear and informed consent or where their condition is so 
intolerable as to be beyond doubt…I cannot say that life-prolonging treatment…would 
provide no benefit…death by this route would…be even less dignified than the death 
which she will more probably face at some time in the more distant future.30
Mason’s subjective judgment approach would elide this outcome, whether on a 
subjective or an objective basis, and may well pay more respect to the patient’s residual 
autonomy as a result. Importantly, however, it would permit the views of the family to 
be taken into account in at least two senses: that they were saying that this woman 
would not want to be kept alive, and that this woman would doubtless not want to 
put her relatives through this experience.
Mason’s choice of Re B as a seminal case has stood the test of time. It is one of those 
cases which has found application far beyond its original remit and which has 
triggered a whole new set of ethical and legal dilemmas. One such other case is 
Mason’s second choice, Gillick v Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority, and these 
are precisely the reasons why he chose it.        
Gillick v Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority
Gillick arose from the publication of a seemingly-innocuous Department of Health 
memorandum of guidance authorising health care professionals to discuss family 
planning with minors without the explicit consent of their parents, albeit in restricted 
circumstances. Crucially, however, this extended to the provision of advice on 
contraception and even contraceptives themselves. Simply,31 Mrs Gillick sought to have 
the instruction declared unlawful; the trial judge and Court of Appeal adopted polar 
opposite views with the Court of Appeal favouring the ‘rights and duties’ of parents. In 
the final analysis, and as Mason has frequently pointed out, more judges agreed with Mrs 
Gillick than disagreed with her, but the ultimate judgment fell to the House of Lords, 
and there the majority – 3:2 – disagreed with the appellant.  
  
The seminal nature of Gillick stems from its attempt to respond to the realities and 
vagaries of human development – a complex process that is not amenable to the so-
often-crude responses of law. As Lord Scarman stated: 
If the law should impose upon the process of growing up fixed limits where nature knew 
only a continuous process, the price would be artificiality and a lack of realism in an area 
                                                
30 Ibid, para 22.
31 While other issues were engaged, such as the potential criminal liability of the health care 
professional, here we only consider the autonomy-related aspects of the case.
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where the law must be sensitive to human development and social change.32  
The law, of course, does exactly this by setting an arbitrary threshold for maturity based 
on numerical age and wholly divorced from subjective capabilities. The House of Lords 
in Gillick sought to establish a mechanism whereby more responsiveness to a child’s 
particular circumstances could be shown; it did so not through the parents, however, but 
through the medical profession, as expressed in the oft-quoted speech of Lord Fraser:
[T]he doctor will, in my opinion, be justified in proceeding without the parents' consent or 
even knowledge provided he is satisfied on the following matters: (1) that the girl 
(although under 16 years of age) will understand his advice; (2) that he cannot persuade 
her to inform her parents or to allow him to inform the parents that she is seeking 
contraceptive advice; (3) that she is very likely to begin or to continue having sexual 
intercourse with or without contraceptive treatment; (4) that unless she receives 
contraceptive advice or treatment her physical or mental health or both are likely to suffer; 
(5) that her best interests require him to give her contraceptive advice, treatment or both 
without the parental consent. 33
The House of Lords made it abundantly clear that this was not carte blanche to the 
profession to ride rough-shod over the (residual) rights and responsibilities of parents 
and this remains embodied in professional guidance to this day.34 The obvious question 
in the immediate aftermath of Gillick was ‘what, precisely, are these (residual) rights and 
responsibilities?’. This was not, however, the primary preoccupation of most, whose
attention, rather, turned to what the Gillick ruling meant for the autonomy of the child.
Barely pausing for breath, the courts assumed that the precedent was not confined to its 
particular circumstances of contraception (and confidentiality35) but that it extended to 
the entire field of consent to medical treatment36 : ‘the term Gillick-competent is now part 
of medico-legal lore’.37 Both issues – that of parental rights and that of child autonomy –
converged in the cases of Re R38 and Re W.39 Each concerned minors of doubtful 
capacity, not for their immaturity per se, but because of mental disorders leading to 
questions about their ability to decide for themselves. In Re R a 15-year old girl displayed 
disturbing behaviour for which medication was required, yet she purported to refuse it 
during her more lucid periods. Re W concerned a 16-year old minor40 suffering from 
anorexia nervosa who refused all care and endangered her life in doing so. In both cases 
the respective courts overrode the children’s refusal and did so on the basis of best 
interests: a court has, through its wardship jurisdiction, the power to overlook any 
consent or refusal by a child if it is in her or his best interests to do so. As for the 
                                                
32 [1985] 3 All ER 402 at 421.
33 Ibid at 413.
34 General Medical Council Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing Information  (2004) para 28.   See 
also General Medical Council Seeking Patients’ Consent: The Ethical Considerations (1998) para 23.
35 We discuss this in Mason and McCall-Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, n 12 above, paras 8.43 – 8.44.
36 See, for example, Re P (a minor) [1986] 1 FLR 272, 80 LGR 301 (court agreed that a schoolgirl 
aged 15 should be allowed to have an abortion against the wishes of her parents. Butler-Sloss 
J said: ‘I am satisfied she wants this abortion; she understands the implications of it’).
37 See, Mason and McCall-Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, n 12 above, para 10.27. This is a classic 
Mason aphorism.
38 [1992] Fam 11, (1991) 7 BMLR 147.
39 Re W (a minor) (medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627, (1992) 9 BMLR 22. For a comparable 
Australian case, see DoCS v Y [1999] NSWSC 644.
40 The statutory aspects of this under s.8 of the Family Reform Act 1969 are discussed in Mason and 
McCall-Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, n 12 above, paras 10.48 – 10.51.
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residual nature of any parental rights, the courts confirmed that the change that had been 
brought about by Gillick was to remove any right to determine that a mature minor 
should be treated; there remained, however, a right to consent on the child’s behalf, even 
in the face of the child’s objection, provided, once again, that her or his best interests 
would be served in doing so.41
So where did this leave the autonomy of mature minors? On one view we might see Re R
and Re W as aberrant cases, distinguishable from Gillick, because they concerned children 
of doubtful capacity and in such cases the general principle of best interests simply 
applies.42 But this could not really hold water since there is no suggestion in the rulings 
that the ‘right’ of a parent or a court to consent is in any way dependent on the child’s 
incapacity; it exists irrespective of mental capacity and, rather, by dint of immaturity per 
se. This was clearly confirmed in  Re L (medical treatment: Gillick competence)43 which 
concerned a critically-ill 14 year-old girl who professed the Jehovah's Witness faith and 
refused any treatment involving blood transfusions; treatment which was necessary to 
save her life. The dispute came to court and it ordered treatment against the child’s 
refusal. Despite her maturity, she was adjudged not to be Gillick-competent on the basis 
that she had formed her views within the confines of her community and had not 
benefited from broader experience, and that she had not been informed of the likely 
horrific nature of her death, albeit that she understood that she would die as a direct 
consequence of her refusal.44 Importantly, however, the court stated obiter that in the 
circumstances of her case treatment would have been ordered even if she had been
Gillick-competent. So the matter seems fairly unequivocal: recognition of a minor’s 
developing autonomy is conditional on treatment decisions being in her or his best 
interests – as the House of Lords intended - and the concern of their Lordships not to 
ride rough-shod over residual parental rights remains a core part of the law.  
At the risk of continuing the Fox & Hounds metaphor too far, it is nevertheless apt to 
recall that Ian Kennedy famously said of Re R that it was ‘driving a coach and horses 
through Gillick’.45 And in Re W we also have Balcolme LJ acknowledging that ‘[i]n logic 
there can be no difference between an ability to consent to treatment and an ability to 
refuse treatment’.46 But logic is not the only issue, nor is autonomy the only value at 
stake. Mason has long argued in defence of a more protectionist stance towards the 
mature minor, particularly where decisions can have serious ramifications such as on-
going suffering or death. But is it a sustainable and defensible position? After years of 
long drawn-out debate – the subject is one of our favourite ‘fights’ in classes that we 
teach together – I rather think that it is; moreover, I think that there are parallels yet to 
be drawn with the law’s attitude towards the adult incompetent that may assist Mason’s 
                                                
41 On the interesting concept of ‘family autonomy’, protected by the Irish Constitution no less, 
see, North Western Health Board v W (H) [2001] IESC 70. For commentary see Laurie, G.T.,
‘Better to Hesitate at the Threshold of Compulsion: PKU Testing and the Concept of Family 
Autonomy in Eire’ (2002) 28 Journal of  Medical Ethics 136.
42  See, in fact, Re R, n 38 above. 
43 [1998] 2 FLR 810. [1998] 2 FLR 810, [1999] 2 FCR 524, [1998] Fam Law 591
44 See too Re E where it was said of a 15-year-old ‘Gillick competent’ boy who was refusing blood 
transfusion: ‘I respect this boy’s profession of faith, but I cannot discount at least the possibility 
that he may in later years suffer some diminution in his convictions’, per Ward J: Re E (a minor)
[1993] 1 F.L.R. 386; [1994] 5 Med. L.R. 73.
45 Kennedy, I., ‘Consent to Treatment: The Capable Person’ in Dyer, C (ed) Doctors, Patients and 
the Law, Oxford, Blackwell, 1992, chapter 3. 
46 Re W (a minor)(medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 627, at 643. 
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case.
Mason’s starting premise is that truly autonomous choices require not only information 
but a level of understanding and appreciation of the consequences of each decision. As 
he has argued:
…while consent involves acceptance of an experienced view, refusal rejects that 
experience – and does so from a position of limited understanding. Furthermore, a refusal 
of medical treatment may close down the options – and this may be regretted later in that 
the chance to consent has now passed. The implications of refusal may, therefore, be more 
serious and, on these grounds refusal of treatment may require greater understanding than 
does acceptance. A level of comprehension sufficient to justify refusal of treatment 
certainly includes one to accept treatment but the reverse does not hold; the two 
conditions cannot be regarded as being on a par.47
An answer to this is to provide more and better information to facilitate understanding. 
This, surely, is the criticism to be levelled at the decision in Re L (above). In this sense, 
the mature minor’s position is not that different from the adult incapax who is also held 
to a higher standard. As Re C (adult: refusal of medical treatment)48 made very clear, a patient 
of dubious capacity must demonstrate actual understanding of the nature and consequences 
of their decision. Mere capacity to understand is not enough as it is for the capax adult, but 
then, the mature minor and the incapax adult do not fall into that category. Nor was the 
ruling in Gillick ever designed to catapult the minor into that category – this comes later 
when the crude numerical threshold is crossed. Only at that point do all of the attendant 
consequences of adulthood follow, one of which is the presumption of capacity. In this 
sense, then, the adult incapax is in a diametrically-opposite position to the mature minor 
for whom the default is a presumption of incapacity. Mason’s argument is not that we should 
not seek to respect the emerging autonomy of children, but rather that we owe them 
continuing obligations to protect them from decisions that are manifestly bad for them.
How do we know that they are bad? Because the parents or the carers or the courts tell 
us so. Such an overtly paternalistic view does not devalue autonomy as a relevant 
criterion but it does seek a more sophisticated accommodation of the values and interests 
at stake: when autonomy and welfare stand in direct opposition it is by no means clear 
that autonomy should be the trump card.49
In the same way that an incompetent adult is not incompetent in respect of all decisions 
because the presumption is one of competence, the corollary holds that a competent child is 
not necessarily competent in respect of all decisions because the presumption is one of 
incompetence. But in all cases where incompetence is in issue – either as a presumption or 
as a fact - the same welfare principles apply if we perceive the patient to be in harm’s 
way. To an extent, however, the framing of the debate in terms of Gillick-competence is 
misleading because this language admits of the possibility that the presumption of 
                                                
47 For a contrary clinico-legal view, see Devereux, J.A., Jones, D.P.H. and Dickenson, D.I., 
‘Can Children Withhold Consent to Treatment?’ (1993) 306 British Medical Journal 1459.
48 [1994] 1 All ER 819, [1994] 1 WLR 290.
49 In the Matter of X [2002] JRC 202 the court respected the refusal of a 16-year-old woman to 
authorise transfer of tissue from her aborted fetus to the police to determine paternity for the 
purposes of possible prosecution of a man for unlawful sexual intercourse. This was so despite 
affidavits from the parents consenting to the procedure. None the less, the court reiterated that 
its inherent jurisdiction meant that the refusal could be overridden in the child’s best interests; in 
the instance case, however, the court was not convinced that those interests would be served by 
dismissing the refusal.  
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incompetence can be rebutted and, for the child, that competence to decide can be 
demonstrated; the implication from this being that competent decisions – however bad –
should be respected. But this is only a part of the considerations required under Lord 
Fraser’s test. No amount of evidence about capacity to decide autonomously can elide 
the responsibility also to consider whether such a decision is nonetheless in the child’s 
own best interests. Thus, as Re L (above) demonstrates, it is entirely possible to 
acknowledge that a state of competence has been reached and still to decide that 
manifestly bad decisions will not be respected. It is one of the few areas of medical law 
concerning ‘choice’ where autonomy does not have the last say.  By the same token, it 
should not be thought that an autonomy perspective and a best interests perspective are 
necessarily mutually exclusive. The decisions in this field are replete with references to 
the need to accommodate the mature minor’s views as far as possible. Nor should it be 
thought that a best interest perspective necessarily means that a refusal of medical care is 
necessarily an unacceptable option. The case of Re T50 demonstrates judicial sensitivity to 
the position of parents who did not want to put their child through painful surgical 
procedures even although there was overwhelming medical support for intervention and 
even although the refusal will meant that the child would die. All this was justified in the 
child’s own best interests.
Those who criticise the rulings typified by Re R and Re W seek to treat mature minor 
autonomy in the same crude sense that the law of majority does – once you reach an all-
important threshold (be it age or Gillick-competence) then the presumption shifts and 
you are free to take all the bad decisions you want irrespective of their consequences. But 
being in a state of autonomy is not an all-or-nothing affair nor is it an irreversible state 
(unlike majority). There may be many times in life when we as adults do not have 
capacity to take our own decisions; not in an organic disease-related sense, but perhaps 
because of a lack of information or understanding or guidance from others. The 
presumption of capacity, however, masks this reality in all but the most clear-cut of cases
which, then, usually are disease-related. No one is there to protect us from ourselves. In 
the context of the child, however, where there is a presumption of incapacity and where 
there is a continuing obligation to protect his or her welfare, such an all-or-nothing 
attitude to autonomous decision-making can be seen as tantamount to abandonment of 
the patient. While we may find this acceptable in the case of the competent adult, there 
are too many doubts and unresolved issues to justify the bringing forward of the ‘clear-
line approach’ to maturity and autonomy. There is no such clear line.     
Re MB (adult: medical treatment) and A-G’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994)
Perhaps the best (or worst?) examples of clear-line thinking in medical law relate to the 
so-called maternal/fetal conflict and to the question of the legal status of the fetus. These 
neatly come together in Mason’s choice of Re MB (adult: medical treatment) and A-G’s 
Reference (No. 3 of 1994) in his list of seminal cases and it makes sense, therefore, that they 
be considered together. The choice of these cases reflects the very strong interest, and 
influence, that Ken Mason has had in reproductive matters throughout the course of his 
‘third’ career.51
                                                
50 Re T (a minor)(wardship: medical treatment) [1997] 1 WLR 242, [1997] 1 All ER 906.
51 Prior to his position as an Honorary Fellow in the School of Law, Ken Mason was Regius 
Professor of Forensic Medicine in the University of Edinburgh and prior to that had a very 
distinguished career as a pathologist in the Royal Air Force. 
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Re MB confirmed that the ruling from the earlier decision in Re T (adult: refusal of medical 
treatment) 52 – that an adult patient of sound mind has an absolute right to consent to or 
to refuse medical treatment - applies equally to the pregnant woman even if her decisions 
might result in the death of her unborn child. Some doubts about the extension of the 
‘absolute autonomy’ principle to the pregnant woman carrying a viable fetus had been 
expressed in Re T itself,53 and the distinction was applied in a handful of extremely 
contentious cases,54 but the Court of Appeal was categoric in Re MB; at least as to 
principle. In practice, however, the position has almost always been different and there is 
precious little evidence of cases in which a pregnant woman’s refusal has been accepted. 
The common scenario in the disputed cases, including Re MB,55 is to impose a finding of 
incompetence thereby allowing the patient to be treated in her own best interests – the 
classic default position. For example, in Bolton Hospitals NHS Trust v O56 the court 
wholeheartedly endorsed the Re MB principle but still found a woman with post 
traumatic stress temporarily incompetent due to panic induced by flash-backs.  
Furthermore, the assumption has always been that it is self-evidently in the woman’s best 
interests for the child to be born. Only in St George’s Healthcare NHS Trust v S, R v Collins, ex p S 57
did the Court of Appeal condemn an involuntary caesarean section which had been 
carried out under the authority of the mental health legislation. This was a trespass on an 
otherwise competent woman.  
For Mason, the tenor of these precedents typifies the bluntness of the law as a tool for 
social chance or for regulating ethical practice. His insights from the medical perspective 
are strongly cognisant of the challenges faced by medical staff and of the dilemma of 
being responsible, simultaneously, for two lives. The categoric ‘principled’ stand of the 
law which so clearly favours one of those lives does not alleviate the ethical dilemma,
even if it makes the position on potential legal liability abundantly clear. It is no wonder 
that the law is ambivalent in practice because the practical realities are far more complex 
than dogged adherence to the principle of the law would suggest. Yet, it is questionable 
whether the law can ever be more responsive to the doctor’s dilemma of ‘two lives/one
choice’ in light of the clear preference for, and privileging of, the principle of respect for 
personal autonomy over other values such as, for example, the principle of sanctity of 
life. But even if the debate were to be re-framed along autonomy lines – for example, the 
autonomy of the woman v. the (future) autonomy of the future person – it is still clear 
that any such conflict could not be resolved ‘…on autonomy grounds alone’.58 And all of 
this ignores the fact that the two parties to the conflict are not of equal standing, at least 
in the eyes of the law. Indeed, it was a concern with the particular legal status of the fetus 
                                                
52 [1992] 4 All ER 649, (1992) 9 BMLR 46.
53 [1992] 4 All ER 649 at 652-653, (1992) 9 BMLR 46 at 50.
54 See Re S (adult: refusal of medical treatment) [1992] 4 All ER 671, (1992) 9 BMLR 69 which was 
decided only two and a half months after Re T. See too, Norfolk and Norwich Healthcare (NHS) 
Trust v W [1996] 2 FLR 613, (1996) 34 BMLR 16, Rochdale Healthcare (NHS) Trust v C [1997] 1 
FCR 274. and Tameside and Glossop Acute Services Trust v CH (a patient) [1996] 1 FLR 762, (1996) 31 
BMLR 93. For analysis see Grubb, A ‘Commentary’ (1996) 4 Medical Law Review 193. The 
consequence in each case was the imposition of a caesarean section against the women’s express 
wishes. 
55 The woman in Re MB suffered from a phobia of needles which led her to refuse a caesarean 
operation while all the time stating that she wanted her baby. She was declared incompetent as a 
result; in the event, however, she consented to the procedure.
56 [2003] 1 FLR 824, [2003] Fam Law 319.
57 See, [1999] Fam 26, (1998) 44 BMLR 194. 
58 I borrow this expression from Ngwena, C. and Chadwick, R., ‘Genetic Diagnostic Information 
and the Duty of Confidentiality: Ethics and Law’ 1 Medical Law International 73.
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that led Mason to add Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994)59 to his list.
Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994) is the first of two criminal cases among Mason’s 
top five. Its significance here lies in the on-going unwillingness of the law – or perhaps 
more accurately, the courts – to grasp the nettle on the definitive status of the fetus in 
law. While this is perhaps more understandable in the context of cases which involve a 
potential conflict between the interests or rights of the mother and those of her fetus 
(should we ever choose to recognise them), this was not a problem in the instant case. As 
Mason has commented: ‘..we are here concerned, not with fetal/maternal conflict, but, 
rather, with the protection of the fetal/maternal symbiosis’.60
Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 3 of 1994) was concerned with the relatively straight-
forward question of whether it would be competent to charge a person with murder for 
the death of a fetus from injuries sustained in utero. The case involved a man who had 
stabbed his pregnant girlfriend and, in doing so, inadvertently also stabbed the fetus. The 
woman went into premature labour and the child was born alive but died 120 days later. 
The man was charged with the murder of the fetus. In yet another example of clear-line 
thinking, it is now common ground that an unborn child has interests protected by law in 
a number of areas,61 but that none of these crystallises as a ‘right’ until the child is born 
alive, and in some cases, survives a requisite period of time.62 Accordingly, there has 
never been a recognised crime of feticide.63 The refusal to recognise the fetus as a bearer of 
rights in se stems back to the seventeenth century,64 and Attorney General’s Reference
presented as a perfect opportunity to revisit the rule. In the end, however, the House of 
Lords did no such thing. Instead, they further obscured the status of the fetus by leaving 
it in a form of legal limbo-land as neither a ‘person’ nor a ‘thing’ but a ‘unique organism’ 
which is not merely a part of its mother but which also had no distinct legal personality. 
Of this ruling Mason has had this to say:
Could it not be that modern genetics, physiology, applied psychology and the rest must 
now cast serious doubt on the concept that the fetus has no distinct human personality? I 
suggest that the serious conceptual disagreements between the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords evidence in the Attorney-General’s Reference under discussion indicate that 
the time has come for a thorough review of fetal status – at least from the point of view of 
the criminal law. It seems wholly illogical that there should be an offence of neonatal 
murder but not of feticide, and that it is safer by far, in both civil and criminal 
jurisdictions, to kill a fetus rather than to injure it.65
One wonders how much logical has to do with it. As was pointed out above in the 
context of the protection of mature minors, logic is not all that is at issue. Although the 
absence of maternal/fetal conflict in this case offered an opportunity to establish a 
                                                
59 [1998] 1 Cr App R 91.
60 Mason, J.K., ‘A Lords’ Eye View of Fetal Status’ (1999) 3 Edinburgh Law Review 246, at 250. 
61 For example, in tort, for negligently-caused harm both under the Congenital Disabilities (Civil 
Liability) Act 1976, and at common law (Burton v Islington Health Authority, De Martell v Merton and 
Sutton Health Authority [1992] 3 All ER 833 and Hamilton v Fife Health Board 1993 SC 369). 
62 The Congenital Disabilities (Civil Liability) Act 1976 requires the child to live 48 hours before 
it can seek compensation under the Act for negligently inflicted injury in utero. 
63 Mason distinguishes feticide from the offence of child destruction under the Infant Life 
Preservation Act 1929 on the basis that, ‘[c]riminal abortion involves the procuring of a woman’s 
miscarriage which only results in feticide consequentially’, see ‘A Lords’ Eye View of Fetal Status’, 
n 60 above, fn 9. 
64 Sir Edward Coke, Institutes of the Law of England, Pt III, Chap 7, at 50.
65 N 60 above, at 249.
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precedent that would not necessarily lead to (impossibly) difficult choices as between 
parties, it must have been at the fore-front of their Lordships’ minds whether – in these 
circumstances – any shift from the threshold of ‘birth’ as the trigger for rights would 
inevitably lead to similar debates being rehearsed in the maternal/fetal context. I have 
considered elsewhere the long-standing ambivalence of the courts to take on board 
arguments about fetal ‘human rights’,66 and Mason has commented more recently on the 
same phenomenon.67  This may be an area where maintaining clear-line thinking – even if 
the thinking itself is far from clear - is the only acceptable judicial policy.    
R v Cox
The above comment on reluctance to recognise any form of fetal rights for fear of losing 
control of the field, is, essentially, a point about slippery slopes, and nowhere are such 
concerns more prevalent than in the field of euthanasia. Mason’s final choice of a 
criminal prosecution of a doctor for the deliberate taking of a patient’s life is apt in 
bringing together the three main branches of medical law – medicine, law and ethics – in 
a particularly acute form where the ultimate respect that might be paid to a patient’s 
autonomy – respect for their choice to die – potentially conflicts with the ‘autonomy’ of 
the medical profession in respecting its primary guiding principle: First do no harm.  
It will be recalled that Dr Cox, a consultant rheumatologist, was convicted of attempted 
murder after administering potassium chloride – which is entirely toxic to the human 
organism and has no therapeutic application – to his patient, Mrs Lillian Boyes, on her 
repeated request to be helped to die to release her from the excruciating pain of her 
rheumatoid arthritis.68 Dr Cox was convicted because the jury had no real choice. The 
usual devices that are employed on behalf of the medical profession to avoid the charge 
of euthanistic practices were not available to Dr Cox. Mrs Boyes was not terminally ill 
and there was therefore no medical intervention keeping her alive that could be 
withdrawn. The agent administered to her had no analgesic effect, so it could not be 
argued that the ‘real’ intention was to relieve pain, and that death only came as an 
attendant consequence. Indeed, the facts pointed to the conclusion that death was the 
primary intention. And finally, since the criminal law universally treats motive as 
irrelevant, the jury was left with the crude question: did Dr Cox intend to kill his 
patient?69 To which the answer was an unqualified ‘yes’.  The law in the United Kingdom 
is currently too intransigent or inflexible to accommodate subtle, but crucial, distinctions 
between cases which do depend on motive.70 As Mason has said: ‘…Dr Cox was certainly 
not a murderer as the word is commonly interpreted’.71
                                                
66 For consideration of whether a human rights analysis might strengthen the legal position of the 
fetus, see Laurie, G.T., ‘Medical Law and Human Rights: Passing the Parcel Back to the 
Profession?’ in Boyle, A. et al (eds) Human Rights and Scots Law: Comparative Perspectives on the 
Incorporation of the ECHR, Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002.
67  Mason, J.K., ‘What’s In a Name? – The Vagaries of Vo v France’ (2005) 17 Child and Family 
Law Quarterly 97.  
68 R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38.
69 R v Cox (1992) 12 BMLR 38 at 39.
70 Contrast this with the position in Switzerland where the legality of an act to assist another in 
dying is all about motive. So long as the assistance is provided is a selfless act – that is it is not for 
a selfish motive – then no criminal liability will flow from a successful assisted suicide. For 
commentary, See Guillod, O. and Schmidt, A., ‘Assisted Suicide under Swiss Law’ 12(1) (2005) 
European Journal of Health Law 25.
71 Mason and McCall-Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, n 12 above, para 17.28.
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So should the law in this field be changed, and what would inform our answer to this 
question one way or the other? It is illuminating within the field of medical law in the 
United Kingdom to contrast the views of Mason with those of Emily Jackson,72 because 
they each come to the discipline from very different perspectives.73 In the present 
context, for example, Jackson has recently argued that the continuing prohibition on 
active euthanasia at the explicit request of a patient runs entirely contrary to the 
autonomy ethos that has gripped the discipline in recent years. In particular, Jackson is
extremely skeptical of the standard position of the medical profession that the mantra 
‘First do no harm’ justifies a blanket ban on physician-assisted or accomplished death.74
Mason has himself pointed to the obvious answer to involving physicians in active 
euthanasia, namely, using specialists in the care of the terminally ill.75 But his concerns are 
far more deep-routed and, as one would imagine, are not resolved by an appeal to 
autonomy alone. First, he is acutely sensitive to the position of responsible medical staff 
who are asked to comply with requests to die when ‘[s]tandard medical teaching remains 
that we should never willingly and deliberately shorten life’.76 This may be anachronistic 
for Jackson, but Mason’s perspective nevertheless accurately reflects the attitude of much
of the profession whose professional autonomy is at stake within any legally-sanctioned 
euthanasia regime.77 This brings us to another of Mason’s concerns, viz, the necessity of 
a conscience clause in any such framework. Recent legislative proposals in the House of 
Lords have reflected this, and the second of two Bills proposed by Lord Joffe included 
not only a conscience clause but also an associated obligation for anyone purporting to 
rely on the clause to refer the patient to a colleague who is prepared to adhere to the 
patient’s request.78 It is interesting to speculate what Mason’s response would be to the 
recommendations from the House of Lords Select Committee set up to consider the Bill. 
In one respect, the Committee takes a broad team-based approach to the issue of 
conscience, acknowledging that:
Conscientious objections could however arise not only from doctors but also from other health care 
professionals, including nurses and pharmacists….[and that any new Bill]… should seek to address such 
                                                
72 Professor of Medical Law at Queen Mary College, University of London.
73 Compare, for example, Mason, J.K., Medico-Legal Aspects of Reproduction and Parenthood, Second 
Edition, Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1998 and Jackson, E., Regulating Reproduction, Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2001. 
74 Jackson, E., ‘Whose Death Is It Anyway? Euthanasia and the Medical Profession’ (2004) 
Current Legal Problems 415.
75 Mason, J.K., ‘Death and Dying: One Step at a Time?’ in McLean, S.A.M. (ed), Death, Dying and 
the Law, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.
76 See Mason and McCall-Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, n 12 above, para 17.105 and quote from 
the medical correspondent of The Times in n 196. 
77 Evidence led to the House of Lords Select Committee on Assisted the Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill suggested that ‘…the Bill, if it were to become law, might well be unworkable 
because of the conscientious objections of many of those who would be called upon to put it 
into practice.’, see House of Lords Select Committee on Assisted the Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill, Assisted Dying for the Terminally Ill Bill – First Report , HL 86-I, 2005, para 
113. The Report continues: ‘We did not, it has to be said, receive indications from the authorities 
in other countries where legislation of this nature has been enacted that significant problems had 
been encountered in regard to conscientious objection by large numbers of doctors and nurses, 
though it is perhaps necessary to bear in mind that the composition of the medical and nursing 
professions in this country is rather different from that in, for example, Holland, where over 90% 
of doctors are of Dutch origin’, ibid, para 114. 
78 Two Bills were proposed in 2003 and 2004 respectively; the latter being the Assisted Dying for the 
Terminally Ill Bill. 
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situations as that in which, for example, a nurse with conscientious objections is asked by a patient to raise 
with a doctor on his or her behalf a request for assisted suicide or voluntary euthanasia.
And I imagine that this would be entirely in keeping with Mason’s own perspective.79 But 
the Select Committee also recommends that the obligation to refer the patient should be 
removed because, ‘[an]…obligation to refer a requesting patient to a colleague could 
nonetheless be regarded as an infringement of conscience’.80 I suspect that this would jar 
with Mason as coming close to patient abandonment in a time of need. However much 
he might disagree with the request, he would probably consider it part of a professional’s 
on-going commitment to the patient to facilitate their autonomous choices where the law 
is set up to see those choices through. The limit here would be on professional autonomy.   
Perhaps contrary to what one might expect from Mason’s medical training and religious 
faith, he is not entirely against assisting people to die; rather, his contribution to the 
debate has focused on the lack of clarity in what we mean by ‘euthanasia’ (only some 
forms of which he will endorse); it has drawn attention to the hypocrisy of the law in 
adhering to non-distinctions such as the act/omission distinction; and it has called for a 
more honest approach to what the medical professions are asked to do when the direct 
result of their actions is the death of their patients. All of this distils to the question of 
how acceptable forms of euthanasia may be brought within the fold of legally acceptable 
practice. Of course, what is ‘acceptable’ is highly subjective, but for Mason this is found 
in two sets of circumstances: the patient suffering from Persistent Vegetative State (PVS) 
and Physician-Assisted Suicide (PAS). Mason stops short, however, of endorsing active 
euthanasia in circumstances such as those in which Dr Cox found himself, largely on the 
grounds of concerns about slippery slopes, informed by the experiences of the 
Netherlands.81 Indeed, he endorses an experiential and incremental approach to the 
legalisation of euthanistic practices.82
It is at this point that Mason and I part company. I am not convinced that any slippery 
slopes that might be deduced from the practice of euthanasia in one (or more) countries 
(and this itself is a disputed matter) necessarily prevents us from adopting a principled 
approach to euthanasia – an approach which is a logical extension of the principle of 
respect for personal autonomy. Nor do I see the impact on patient autonomy of 
disrespecting requests for assistance in dying as comparable to the impact on 
professional autonomy of respecting such requests. The disparity is simply to great not to 
prefer the former over the latter. But, then, this paper is not about me.     
The role of legislation in this field is integral to Mason’s approach. We have argued 
elsewhere in the context of the PVS patient that to rely on the fallacy of ‘futility’ to justify 
the withdrawal or withholding of artificial feeding and hydration from such a patient is 
fundamentally dishonest in that it obscures the reality that we have taken a quality of life 
decision that this person should die. No amount of semantics can avoid this, yet the 
continued reliance on this reasoning leaves the courts with only one option: to authorise 
the starvation of patients to death. This cannot now be changed save through statute and 
                                                
79 See, for example, in the context of abortion, Mason’s comments on R v Salford Health Authority, 
ex parte Janaway [1998] 2 WLR 442, CA; sub nom Janaway v Salford Area Health Authority [1989] AC 
537, HL in Medico-legal Aspects of Reproduction and Parenthood, n 16 above, pp.127-129.
80 Select Committee Report, n 77 above, para 32. 
81 See, Mason and McCall-Smith’s Law and Medical Ethics, n 12 above, paras 17.16 – 17.23 and paras 
17.120 – 17.124.
82 Mason, J.K. and Mulligan, D., ‘Euthanasia by Stages’ (1996) 347 The Lancet 810.
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we have advocated that this should be so.83 In the context of Physician-Assisted Suicide 
Mason has proposed a number of reforming measures,84 including this simple 
amendment to the Suicide Act 1961:
The provisions of s 2(1) shall not apply to a registered medical practitioner who, given the 
existence of a competent directive, is providing assistance to a patient who is suffering 
from a progressive and irremediable condition and who is prevented, or will be prevented, 
by physical disability from ending his or her own life without assistance.
In the final analysis, however, and as is stated above, Mason would not go so far as to 
condone, let alone legalise, what Dr Cox did for Lillian Boyes. In fact, his concerns may 
be summed up best if I rephrase this slightly: He would not condone nor legalise what 
Dr Cox did to Lillian Boyes. And, this, perhaps, is where the heart of the concern lies –
the prospect of the medical professional taking on the mantle of the Bringer of Death is 
too much for a medical man whose conscience, and whose commitment to others, 
cannot allow autonomy arguments to triumph – however logical they may be.     
                                                
83 See, Mason, J.K. and Laurie, G.T., ‘The Management of the Persistent Vegetative State in the 
British Isles’ [1996] Juridical Review 263 and for problems with the current statutory provisions, 
see Laurie, G.T. and Mason, J.K., ‘Negative Treatment of Vulnerable Patients: Euthanasia by any 
Other Name?’ [2000] Juridical Review 159. 
84 See, for example, ‘Euthanasia by Stages’, n 82 above, and Myers, D.W. and Mason, J.K., 
‘Physician Assisted Suicide: A Second View from Mid-Atlantic’ (1999) 28 Anglo-American Law 
Review 265. 
